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INTRODUCTION

In 1971, Stephen Wexler argued in "Practicing Law for Poor People" that what poverty lawyers should be doing was, in a word, organizing.I Wexler flaunted a tough-minded disdain, not only for individual
claim assertion, but also for the purely individual concerns of particular
clients. Instead, he advocated efforts to assist the poor to collective
power.
In his 1977 diagnosis of the state of poverty practice, Gary Bellow
argued that what legal services lawyers should be doing was "focused
case pressure." 2 He proposed aggregating small housing or welfare
claims in order to generate pressure on institutions engaged in systemic
misconduct and to encourage collaborative action among clients. Like
Wexler, Bellow advocated collective empowerment, but the process he
envisioned was smaller in scale and more informal. Bellow expressed
concern about lawyers dominating clients with their own agendas and
argued that heightened lawyer accountability was an important virtue of
small scale client collaboration.
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, a large body of literature on
poverty practice emerged. This literature focused intensely on the problem of lawyer domination, which it portrayed not-as Wexler had-as a
necessary evil, nor-as Bellow had-as a remediable failing, but as an
overwhelming menace stalking the most sophisticated and well-meaning
efforts to respect autonomy. In this literature, client empowerment
* Professor of Law, Stanford University. I am grateful for comments from Guyora Binder,

Jamie Boyle, Janet Halley, Bill Hing, and Mark Kelman.
1. Stephen Wexler, PracticingLaw for Poor People, 79 YALE L.J. 1049, 1053 (1971).

2. Gary Bellow, Turning Solutions Into Problems: The Legal Aid Experience, 34 NLADA
BRIEFCASE 119 (1977).
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means liberation from lawyers as much as obtaining leverage on the
outside world. The scale of practice portrayed is typically small-often
one on one-and the benefits are often as much psychological as they
are material. 3
At each stage in this remarkable evolution, the concern with lawyer
oppression of clients has increased, while the scale of material and organizational ambitions has declined. Of course, it is easy enough to correlate this intellectual development with the course of practice. Wexler
wrote as counsel to the national organization coordinating the welfare
rights movement of the late 1960s and early 1970s-the last time lawyers participated in anything resembling large scale collective action by
poor people. Bellow wrote at a time when a significant legal services
movement had gained institutional security, but the energy and inspiration for collective practice seemed to be draining rapidly. The new poverty lawyers write at a time when practitioners feel besieged by hostile
politicians and rebuffed by the judiciary, and the idea that lawyering
might serve ambitious collective goals seems less plausible than ever.
Thus, we find ourselves in the peculiar situation of having for the
first time an extensive and rich literature on poverty law-a literature
that makes substantial progress toward the goal of bringing theory to
bear on practice-at a time when the general state of poverty law practice is so depressing. This work draws in a sophisticated way on a
breath-taking array of ambitious social theories, and it is informed by
concrete knowledge of the texture of practice.
I admire this literature and am pleased to have had my own work
associated with it. However, I have reservations about it that I want to
explore here: I think that it does not adequately treat several lawyering
GERALD P. L6PEZ, REBELLIOUS
ONE CHICANO'S VISION OF PROGRESSIVE LAW PRACTICE (1992); Lucie White,

3. Prominent examples of this large literature include
LAWYERING:

Subordination,RhetoricalSurvival Skills, and Sunday Shoes: Notes on the Hearing ofMrs. G., 38
BUFFALO L. REV. 1 (1990); Anthony V. Alfieri, Reconstructive Poverty Law Practice: Learning
Lessons of Client Narratives, 100 YALE L.J. 2107 (1991); Barbara Bezdek, Silence in the Court.
Participationand Subordination of Poor Tenants' Voices in Legal Process, 20 HOFsTRk L. REV.
533 (1992); Peter Gabel & Paul Harris, Building Power and Breaking Images: CriticalLegal
Theory and the Practice of Law, 11 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 369 (1983); Clark D.
Cunningham, The Lawyer as Translator, Representation as Text: Towards an Ethnography of
Legal Discourse, 77 CORNELL L. REv. 1298 (1992); Robert D. Dinerstein, A Meditation on the
Theoretics of Practice, 43 HASTINGs L.J. 971 (1992); Bill Ong Hing, Raising Personal
Identification Issues of Class, Race, Gender, Sexual Orientation,Physical Disability,and Age in
Lawyering Courses, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1807 (1993).
I make no effort to do justice to the many differences among these writers, nor to take
account of all of their contributions. My remarks have been influenced by the appraisals of this
work in Ruth Buchanan's and Gary Blasi's contributions to this symposium, and by Joel F.
Handler, Postmodernism, Protest, and the New Social Movements, 26 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 697
(1992).
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issues, especially those concerning collective practice. In pursuing this
point, I do not mean to minimize the great contribution this work makes
to understanding the lawyer-client relation and the effect of legal institutions on poor people's sense of themselves. On the other hand, I mean
to say more than that there are important topics that these authors don't
deal with extensively. I think that the preoccupation of the new poverty
law scholars with professional domination and their premises about the
nature of domination perpetuate some mistaken conservative views
about law practice.

II.

SELF-ASSERTION FOR THE CLIENT; SELF-EFFACEMENT FOR
THE LAWYER

The new poverty law scholarship proceeds from two central premises, one about clients and one about representation. The client premise
insists on the dignity, insight, and abilities of poor people. The scholars
make this claim in the face of a largely implicit conventional view that
treats poor clients as if they had nothing to teach their lawyers and nothing to contribute to advocacy efforts on their behalf. The new scholarship insists that overcoming the cultural distance that obscures the
political sophistication and coping skills of poor clients is the first duty
of the poverty lawyer.
The representationpremise portrays power and oppression as pervasive and diffuse in the professional interaction. This point involves a
revision of older, more conventional leftist views that see power in terms
of the larger structures of political economy. In the new scholarship,
power does its work through the micro-structures of everyday life: the
physical layouts of courtrooms and workplaces, the rituals of interaction
in courts and other public places, and the conventional modes of communication in public life. In particular, language and speech constitute
arenas of power. For example, rhetorical styles empirically associated
with white upper-class males are given implicit normative primacy in
the credibility judgments of official actors. Specialized jargon serves to
disable people from participating in conversations about matters that
affect them. Helping professionals who purport to speak for poor people
are incapable of empathic understanding and systematically reprocess
what their clients say in ways that subvert their intentions. Such practices conspire to "silence" the poor client.
One disheartening implication of this view of power is that the lawyer is constantly at risk of implication in the structures she needs to
challenge to benefit the client. Her own role is defined in terms of a
range of social practices that are themselves micro-structures of power
that contribute to the larger patterns of subordination. But there is also a
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heartening implication: if oppressive power is more omnipresent than
the old left view suggests, it is also less omnipotent. The battle can be
fought on millions of fronts and, on many of them, victories are possible. For example, the way the lawyer arranges her office, where she has
the client stand in court, or how she interviews and examines the client
can all yield micro-victories over oppression.
The prescribed goal of the new scholarship is "empowerment" or
enhancing the autonomy of the client. This means, first, minimizing the
lawyer's own power or the social power the lawyer would otherwise
tend to implement. Second, it means enlarging the client's capacities for
self-assertion. The idea is to enable, or at least not disable, clients to
assert their own goals, to draw on the insight they already have, and to
act on their own behalf.
III.

THE DARK SECRET

The Dark Secret of Progressive Lawyering is that effective lawyers
cannot avoid making judgments in terms of their own values and influencing their clients to adopt those judgments. This is so for the following reasons:
First, lawyers choose their clients. Even if they delegate the choice
to other people, organizations, or the market, the decisions to delegate
involve choices that influence the outcomes.
Second, the advice lawyers give clients and the representational
tactics they choose on behalf of clients are inevitably influenced by the
lawyers' own values. This advice and these tactics in turn influence
clients' perceptions of their interests. There is no value-free mode of
communication in which clients could be presented with unfiltered
information needed for decision. Advice has to be limited and structured in ways that will reflect the advisor's values. Similarly, tactical
choices that the lawyer makes may affect not only opposing parties but
also the client's sense of his own interests.4
Third, collective practice involves commitments to multiple clients
with potentially differing interests. To engage in this kind of practice,
lawyers have to make choices that influence the balance of power
among these interests. If conflicts materialize, lawyers will have to take
sides. (Even if they react by withdrawing or deferring to the instructions
of someone else, those decisions will affect the balance of power.) If
conflicts do not materialize, lawyers will make decisions (or will choose
others to make decisions) that affect the contours of organizational
4. This point is amply acknowledged in the new poverty law scholarship. See the works

cited in note 3 and also William H. Simon, Lawyer Advice and Client Autonomy: Mrs. Jones's
Case, 50 MD. L. REv. 213 (1991).
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power.5

Lawyers have to make all these choices and decisions in terms of
their own values. Even a decision to defer to someone else is a decision
that, if not arbitrary, must be based on some judgment about why the
other is entitled to deference in this matter. What potentially redeems
this situation from constituting oppression is that the lawyers' values
may include notions such as democracy, autonomy, and equality that
mandate respect and empowerment for the client. People, however, tend
to differ over what such values mean in any given context. Except in the
highly unlikely circumstances in which all clients fully understand and
share the lawyer's values at the outset of the relationship, the lawyer's
efforts to respect and empower the clients are likely to involve power
over the clients, that is, the imposition of lawyer values.
I call this situation a "Dark Secret" because the established bar has
been at pains to deny it for the past hundred years.6 Mainstream lawyers
have long aspired to see their work as apolitical-as not involving
choices for which they have substantive responsibility or which might
legitimate public concern or regulation. Thus, the bar has insisted that
effective lawyers merely carry out the will of their clients. They have
tended to ignore the fact that lawyers choose their clients (aside from
ineffectual laments that the resulting distribution of legal services is so
skewed). They have mistakenly portrayed the practice of counseling as
the neutral presentation of information for autonomous client decision.
In the case of collective practice, the bar has been alternately
obsessed with and blind to the problems of conflicts of interests. In its
moments of obsession, the bar tends to find conflicting interests everywhere and discourages lawyers from multiple representation. In its
moments of blindness, the bar ignores conflicting interests and treats
multiple representation as tantamount to individual representation.
For many decades the bar's pattern of oscillation between these two
perspectives on collective practice could be very simply summarized.
When individuals were formally organized as a business corporation, the
bar treated them as a unit and approved the lawyer's representation of
the "corporation" as if it were an individual with unitary interests. In

nearly all other situations, the bar expressed hostility toward, or at least
suspicion of, collective practice on the ground that it would involve the
lawyer in potential conflicts, and it often persecuted lawyers affiliated
with consumer, labor, and civil rights groups who were attempting to
coordinate claims in order to achieve the benefits of collective action
5. See generally William H. Simon, Visions of Practicein Legal Thought, 36 STAN. L.
469 (1984).
6. Id. at 470-84.

REv.
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routinely available to corporations. Although the bar's current positions
are more complex, the tendency toward blindness to internal conflicts of
formally organized clients and oversensitivity to conflicts among
noncorporate clients persists.
One would expect that the new poverty law scholarship would be
well positioned to reject this perspective. The new scholars have
absorbed modernist and post-modernist critiques of the idea of neutral
communication and autonomous decision. They profess support for collective practice. And they are leftists who are aware of the conservative
purposes to which the older doctrines have been put.
Yet, to a surprising extent the new scholarship continues to implicitly deny or at least ignore the Dark Secret. It tends to ignore the way
lawyers choose clients. Most of its narratives start out with a lawyer
who already has a client. And to the extent collective issues are
addressed, they usually take the form of an effort to "find allies" who
already share the goals of the given client. Although the ways in which
lawyers influence clients are acknowledged, they are treated as thoroughly pathological. When lawyers are portrayed as having responsibilities to collectivities or "communities," the communities are described as
if they were fully constituted with homogeneous interests.
Because it does not adequately acknowledge the Dark Secret, the
new scholarship suffers from at least three major problems:
First, the client "empowerment" recommended by the new scholarship seems quite similar to the client autonomy exalted in the traditional
doctrine. In this respect, the new scholarship seems much less radical in
principle than in rhetoric. If "empowerment" means simply respecting
the client's own sense of her goals, then this is exactly what mainstream
doctrines prescribe. If it means enhancing the client's potential for selfhelp, it is, if not required by mainstream doctrine, certainly not discouraged by it.
Where the new poverty law scholarship differs from mainstream
doctrine is in its appreciation of the difficulty of respecting the client's
autonomy. Mainstream doctrine treats the process of learning and
respecting client goals as straightforward. On the other hand, the new
poverty law scholars recognize myriad ways in which well-intentioned
lawyers can misunderstand and dominate their clients. This recognition,
however, involves them in a difficulty. The scholars are committed both
to a post-modernist belief that identities and relations are constantly constructed in the process of interaction (the representation premise) and a
pre-modemist belief in the ingrained virtue and insight of poor people
(the client premise). These conflicting commitments make it difficult to
explain the lawyer's intervention.
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The pre-modernist commitment leads to the prescription that the
lawyer leave the client alone (not dominate her). But this raises the
question of what the lawyer can usefully contribute. The post-modernist
premise suggests that only a fairly minor intervention could avoid
changing the client. Indeed, one tendency of the scholars is to describe
lawyering in terms that connote a fairly minor intervention-for example, as a form of "translation" of obscurantist professional rhetoric into
lay terms that enables clients to act on the basis of their pre-existing
insight. But this approach seems to trivialize poverty and subordination.
One would almost think that a good dictionary would be enough to overcome them.7

Lawyers and professional advisors for the dominant social groups
seem to do considerably more than translation for these groups. For
example, they assist them in reflecting on their goals by offering a
detached perspective, they give strategic advice, and they try to persuade
third parties to support the client. Note that when lawyers get in trouble,
they rarely represent themselves, even though they are presumably fluent in the law and require no translation.
Another tendency of this literature is to describe lawyering in ways
that suggest a considerably more ambitious intervention-say, as a form
of "consciousness raising" that creates confidence, solidarity, and clarity
out of insecurity, alienation, and confusion. But this approach makes it
impossible to see how the lawyer could ever avoid imposing her own
view on the client. Having absorbed the lessons of post-modernism, the
scholars can't believe that there is any neutral process of consciousnessraising that merely facilitates the emergence of some immanent client
character. The structure of the consciousness-raising process is necessarily a structure of power, and the ways the lawyer influences that
structure will necessarily influence the outcomes.
Thus, on the premises of this literature, it is hard to imagine a role
for the lawyer that would make a difference without oppressing the
client.
The second major problem is that the normative premises of the
new literature are not plausible. The problem is not so much with the
idea of client empowerment as with the idea of lawyer self-effacement.
Mainstream doctrine portrays the lawyer as mediating between client goals and a determinate, just system that delineates the boundaries of
each citizen's autonomy. Since lawyers are presumptively morally com7. Although the new poverty law scholars acknowledge that translation can be complex and
creative, see Cunningham, supra note 3, the purpose of the metaphor seems to be to humble the
lawyer and flatter the client by suggesting that the lawyer merely removes a minor technical
obstacle to an understanding that the client can otherwise achieve on her own.
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mitted to the system, serving the autonomy of any client is consistent
with the lawyer's own moral autonomy. But radical lawyers don't see
the system as either just or determinate. They see the assertion of legal
claims as part of a broad political struggle.
Radical lawyers thus cannot think that their work is valuable and
fulfilling just because they help enforce their clients' legal rights. The
fact that their clients are poor is critical to their sense of professional
worth and satisfaction. But the new scholarship seems hostile to
allowing the expression of any personal commitments of the lawyer
beyond the general commitment to the poor. Once the client is identified as poor, her values are supposed to determine the relation.
Yet this position seems to condemn the radical lawyer to an experience that, in almost any other context, she would call alienation, since
the values of even poor clients' will sometimes be different from those
of the lawyer. The left has always considered the ability to express
one's values in one's work as a defining quality of a just, humane society. Presumably this is part of what lawyers are trying to help poor
clients achieve. Why should they be denied this benefit themselves?
To say that lawyers have a legitimate interest in expressing their
values in their work is not to say they should be able to control their
clients. It is to say that not all lawyer power and influence should be
seen as illegitimate domination. I don't have any formulas about the
legitimate range of lawyer influence, though I'll give some examples
below. But I think consideration of this issue has been inhibited by a
reluctance exemplified in this literature to acknowledge any legitimate
lawyer interest in participating in formulating the goals of the relation.
On this normative point, radical poverty law scholarship again
tracks mainstream doctrine. For the established bar, the goals of the
relation are to be set by the client. 8 But this premise, morally implausible enough for mainstream lawyers, seems doubly so for poverty lawyers. Most mainstream lawyers allocate their efforts through the market
to the highest bidders, thus obviating normative judgments. But poverty
lawyers typically disapprove of this practice and in any event cannot
practice it themselves. They must make normative judgments about
how to distribute their services, and of course, they cannot defer to clients here, because they don't know who the clients are until the judgments are made.
The third problem with the new literature is that it has difficulty
squarely addressing some of the critical aspects of collective practice.
The scholars express considerably more sympathy to noncorporate col8. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDucT Rule 1.2(a).
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lective activity than mainstream doctrine, but on examination this difference is less substantial than it initially appears. The bar's anxiety about
collective action stems from the beliefs that, first, multiple clients tend
to have conflicting interests, and second, lawyers have difficulty functioning effectively in situations of conflicting interests.
It seems unlikely that the new poverty law scholars can deny the
second point. The reason mainstream doctrine deems lawyering ill
adapted to situations of conflicting interests is that such situations might
require lawyers to make value judgments about the relative validity of
competing client claims. Since the choice among client interests would
involve resort to some value other than those asserted by clients, such a
choice would require the lawyer to look to some commitment of her own
or of some authoritative source other than the clients. And this would
have to be seen as oppressive power.
So the reason why collective action seems less problematical to the
new scholars cannot be their greater willingness for lawyers to resolve
client conflicts of interest. It must be that they are less prone to see the
interests of poor people as in conflict. And this, in turn, seems related to
their commitment to viewing poor clients as attractive people. But this
is naive. The client premise is valuable or at least harmless as long as it
is treated as a presumption designed to inhibit the lawyer's instinct
toward arrogance or paternalism, but it is untenable as a categorical
dogma. Poor people are capable of the same kinds of selfishness, false
consciousness, and incompetence as non-poor people. Such qualities are
destructive of efforts at collective action, and a lawyer who blinds herself to them is incompetent to assist collective action. Moreover, even
smart, virtuous, capable people are prone to have different views of what
their own and their groups' interests are.
Poor people are not more likely than non-poor people to have consensus about their interests. Indeed, an interesting argument made
recently by Claus Offe asserts that they are more likely to have conflicting notions of their interests than the most advantaged groups in the
society, and that this greater likelihood represents a critical structural
axis of disadvantage.9 Offe argues that a major reason why capitalists
do better than the poor is that the capitalists are better organized. He
claims that a major reason for this is that it is easier for them to organize
because they have a stronger sense of common interest. Although capitalists may have diverse preferences and beliefs, they share a basic interest in profit that is both objectively formulable in terms of a unitary
metric and separable from other material and nonmaterial interests. This
9. Claus Offe, Two Logics of Collective Action, in DISORGANIZED CAPIrrALISM 170-220
(John Keane trans. 1985).
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distinctive common interest makes it relatively easy for capitalists to
achieve the necessary agreement for collective action in pursuit of profit.
Poor people, on the other hand, must organize as workers, or members of a residential community, or a group defined by ethnicity, gender,
or some other social category. The interests of the prospective members
of such groups resist reduction to a common metric. Even the purely
economic interests of workers will involve trade-offs between job security and compensation, cash and fringe benefits, current and future compensation. And even to the extent material interests can be reduced to a
common metric, these interests are typically inseparable from other
noneconomic interests, for example, safety or comfort or personal autonomy or dignity. Conflicting views of self and group interest will thus be
more numerous and intense within groups of poor people, and achieving
the agreement necessary for effective collective action will be harder.
Organization on the basis of consensus is difficult generally, and
especially difficult for the poor. Thus, to maintain an existing group it
may be necessary to rely either on coercion (for example, binding a
minority to majority rule) or selective incentives (rewarding members on
an individual basis for contributions to the group). The same principles
apply to organizing unaffiliated people; only here the coercive power or
selective incentives would have to come from some source outside the
unorganized community, perhaps from "outside agitators" or social
reformers.
Now if this argument is correct, it means real trouble for any
attempt to integrate collective practice into the perspective of the new
poverty law scholarship. For the application of coercion and selective
incentives can only look like illegitimate power in this perspective.
Even if we reject the claim that conflicts of interest are less tractable for the poor than for capitalists, the problems remain. Any degree of
conflict of interests among client constituencies will necessarily require
lawyer judgments about the comparative legitimacy of different client
goals that cannot be made in terms of articulated client goals. This
seems unacceptable in the new poverty law scholarship framework.
IV.

ORGANIZING AND LAWYER POWER

I want to illustrate the difficulty that collective practice poses for
the new scholarship by mentioning two traditional approaches to
organizing disadvantaged people.
The first might be called cathartic. The organizer structures a situation to induce a sense of common interest, hope, and potency among the
people she is trying to organize. In one variation, the organizer encourages people to engage some project of mutual assistance that they con-
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sidered beyond their abilities. For example, in John Steinbeck's In
Dubious Battle'°-a romantic portrayal of Communist Party style
organizing-the organizer, by pretending to have medical expertise, gets
a group of farmworkers to collaborate in delivering a baby.
In another variation, the organizer "rubs raw," as Saul Alinsky put
it, a sense of grievance among individuals; she brings them together so
they can discover that they share this sense; she then arranges a confrontation between the aggrieved and some powerful adversary in which the
adversary feels compelled to yield something to them."I The organizer
chooses an issue big enough for people to care about, but small enough
so that success in the confrontation is likely. In an Alinsky classic, the
grievance involves trash that the City has allowed to accumulate on an
abandoned lot, and a confrontation at City Hall forces municipal officials to promise to clean it up. Gary Bellow has described how he once
invited a group of farmworker clients to attend a deposition he took of
their employer.12 In that case, the "victory" was that the lawyer forced
the employer to acknowledge the workers' grievance by submitting to
disciplined examination about it. In all such cases, the "victory" is less
important than the fact that it confirms the nascent group's sense of
identity and efficacy.
The other approach to organizing involves the conditional provision
of benefits. The organizer recruits members by touting the material
advantages of membership-for example, the prospect of job security,
or wage increases, or strike or sickness benefits that a union might negotiate for its members. Organizational discipline is maintained in part by
conditioning continued membership on compliance with the organization's rules and by providing for the forfeit of benefits when a member
is expelled. Or the organization may sanction noncompliance through
fines or other such penalties. For example, unions believe that it is very
important to be able 13to penalize members who resign and cross picket
lines during a strike.
Sometimes lawyers assist in the conditional benefit strategy by
helping to design and enforce the rules of the organization. Sometimes
they become the conditional benefit themselves; organizers use a promise of legal services as an inducement to join. Thus, a union might
recruit by promising its members legal help with unlawful discharge or
workers' compensation claims; a welfare rights movement might recruit
10. JOHN STEINBECK, IN DUBIOUS BATTLE 52-62 (Penguin ed. 1979) (1936).
11. SAUL P. ALINSKY, REVEILLE FOR RADICALS (1946).
12. Comment, The New Public Interest Lawyers, 79 YALE L.J. 1069 (1970).
13. See David Abraham, Individual Autonomy and Collective Empowerment in Labor Law.
Union Membership Resignations and Strikebreaking in the New Economy, 63 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1268, 1270, 1301 (1988).
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by promising members legal help with public assistance claims. 14
These approaches do not assume that people are uniquely or ultimately motivated by short-term or material concerns. The most basic
motivation of collective political action is a sense of shared identity and
purpose. If such a sense does not emerge, a political movement will fail.
But if short-term material incentives are not sufficient for effective political action by the poor, they may be necessary for it, especially in times
of confusion and stress.
The striking fact about both these organizing approaches is that
they are equally inimical to the mainstream conception of advocacy and
that of the new poverty law scholarship. The cathartic approach is unacceptably manipulative. It violates the principle that the client is supposed to be taken as she is, not transformed in accordance with the
lawyer's vision of how she ought to be. The tendency of the mainstream
approach to condemn this kind of practice is tempered only by a theoretical difficulty. Since the mainstream approach accepts client autonomy
as more or less an article of faith, it has trouble seeing the lawyer's
conduct as oppressive when the client ultimately comes to share the lawyer's view. But the new poverty law scholarship, with its sensitivity to
the pervasiveness and subtlety of power and the ways in which oppression can take the form of consent by the oppressed, should have no
trouble recognizing this type of practice as an exercise of power by the
organizer, and it seems committed to condemning it categorically.
Mainstream doctrine is uncomfortable with the conditional benefit
strategy because it puts the lawyer in a position where, if conflict
emerges between the organization and its members, he will feel pressure
to betray one to the other."5 Mainstream doctrine prefers to resolve such
conflicts by having the lawyer assume responsibility to only the organization (reified as a unity and usually identified with its senior officials)
or to the individual member. The established doctrine of the bar views it
as unacceptable for a lawyer asserting an individual claim on behalf of a
member to defer to the organization in conducting his litigation strategy,
and it is uncomfortable with the idea that a lawyer might condition individual representation on the individual's loyalty to the organization.
Based on such concerns, the organized bar for decades attempted to constrain or stamp out a variety of group advocacy programs of unions,
reform groups like the NAACP, and consumer groups like the American
14. See George E. Bodle, Group Legal Services: The Case for BRT, 12 UCLA L. REV. 306
(1965); LAWRENCE NEIL BAILIS, BREAD OR JUSTICE: GRASSROOTS ORGANIZING IN THE WELFARE
RIGHTS MOVEMENT (1974).

15. See Gary Bellow & Jeanne Kettleson, From Ethics to Politics: Confronting Scarcity and
Fairnessin Public Interest Practice, 58 B.U. L. REV. 337, 343, 364 (1978).
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Automobile Association. Partly due to the pressure of the Supreme
Court's First Amendment jurisprudence, the bar has become more reconciled to such advocacy than before, but its doctrines continue to con-.
16
strain efforts of this kind.
The new poverty law scholarship has yet to focus on the strategic
issues of collective advocacy, but I don't see how its doctrines can be
any more hospitable. The idea that the individual could be legitimately
constrained by the group, though essential to effective collective action,
doesn't sit easily with the tendency to see all constraint as power and all
power as oppressive. Moreover, the lawyer's choices between individual and group or among different group constituents will have to be
made on the basis of commitments or principles independent of the individuals and constituents themselves, and I don't see how this can be
portrayed as anything but cultural imperialism in the framework of the
new poverty law scholarship.
It may be, as some post-modernists have suggested, that the nature
of progressive political activism is changing in ways that make the traditional preoccupations of coercion and incentives obsolete. Perhaps
political organization is becoming more voluntaristic, evanescent, multifarious. The old paradigm of the residence- or workplace-based organization asserting a broad ideological identity, balancing coercion and
incentives to maintain discipline-typified by the early 20th century
political party or labor union-may be a thing of the past. In its place
we may find a diverse array of smaller, more voluntaristic, more issue17
focused groups.
However, while there have been important changes in the organization of protest groups in recent years, the corresponding changes in the
organization of the dominant, establishment groups seem less dramatic.
The dominant groups in the society still make extensive use of collective
coercion, material incentives, and the assertion of encompassing ideological identities, and the efficacy of their efforts does not seem to be
declining. It seems mere wishful thinking for the left to suppose that it
can avoid the traditional moral and practical difficulties of organization.
V.

THE INFLUENCE OF POST-MODERNISM

The new poverty law scholarship draws with great sophistication
on a wide variety of social theory. Nevertheless, they tend to be more
interested in cultural and psychological issues than in institutional and
moral ones. They follow the prominent current of left thought that runs
16. See generally Bodle, supra note 14, at 318-24.
17. See PAULINE MARIE ROSENAU, POST-MODERNISM

(1992).
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away from political economy and moral philosophy toward issues of
identity. In this regard, I see strong influence from some notable postmodem theorists, especially Jacques Derrida (though this is often
implicit, because he is not often cited) and Michel Foucault (who is frequently cited).18 In both instances this influence seems unfortunate.
Derrida is the implacable critic of reductionism. He portrays
attempts to reach particular conclusions from general premises or to subsume particular characteristics and situations under general concepts as a
form of brutality-a willful denial of ambiguity, particularity, or
"difference."
Foucault is the micro-sociologist of power, portraying it as a pervasive effluvia and showing how it operates in small-scale, local situations.
He argues that modem liberal societies replace authoritarian rule with a
panoply of decentralized disciplinary techniques that operate in small
group, face-to-face situations, often through the medium of human service professionals. Many of his works are devoted to portraying the
ostensibly benevolent doctrines and practices of professionals as structures of control.
Both Derrida and Foucault have important uses. Derrida's analytical techniques can be used to show how legal rhetoric marginalizes or
"silences" poor people by implicitly denying important aspects of their
experience. Foucault offers more sophisticated descriptive methodology
and background theoretical vision for demonstrations of the way poverty
lawyers can, in the rhetoric of the 1960s, "cool out" their clients and
encourage them to accept the prevailing social structures.
In other ways, however, Derrida and Foucault seem wildly incompatible with the aims of the new poverty law scholars. Derrida regards
all attributions of identity as oppressive and all assertions of cultural
authenticity as fraudulent. His thought is thus inimical to the project of
helping poor clients speak in their own voices. Since Foucault portrays
all power as control, he leaves no room the idea of "empowerment"power that enables rather than disciplines. 19
18. See, e.g., JACQUES
(1980).

DERRIDA, OF GRAMMATOLOGY

(1976);

MICHEL FOUCAULT, POWER/

KNOWLEDGE

19. At least this notion of power-as-oppression is implicit in Foucault's historical studies of
"disciplinary" society. In some of his later delphic pronouncements, Foucault disclaims this view
while acknowledging that it appears in his earlier work. E.g., POWER/KNOWLEDGE, supra note 18,
at 118-19. I don't find the formulations Foucault offers in place of the earlier view as all that
different. In his critique of my argument, Steven Winter characterizes Foucault's view as "every
constraint is an enablement and every enablement a constraint." Steven L. Winter, Cursing the
Darkness, 48 U. MiAMi L. REv. 1115, 1127 (1994). But if a vital task of practice is to distinguish
empowerment from oppression, to say that power is always both is no more helpful than to say
that it is always empowerment or always oppression. (Nor, I'd add, is it any more plausible.)
Contrary to Winter's implication, I intended my critique of post-modernist antinomianism as
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The key point is that both theorists violently reject the idea that
ideological or normative commitments might regulate and legitimate
collective coercion, an idea essential to collective practice. Derrida's
and Foucault's antinomianism leads to both the political ambiguity of
their writings and to their affinities toward anarchism and nihilism. Foucault's politics associated him on occasion with various forms of revolutionary terrorism (the Maoist Red Guards, the Iranian mullahs) and
horrifically vicious acts of destruction (the September massacres of
1792, Pierre Riviere's slaughter of his family).2" Derrida's compulsive
resistance to characterization makes his politics notoriously ambiguous.
Although he is not a nihilist (or anything else) in principle, the political
practice associated with his doctrines often seems nihilistic, as for example, in the bizarre left-wing apologies for Nazism found in his defense of
Paul de Man or in his fellow deconstructionist Jacques Verges' defense
of Klaus Barbie.2 '
The new poverty law scholars seem to have adopted some of the
major premises of post-modernism without confronting their ambiguous
and disturbing implications for practice.
The most valuable discussion of power in recent years is not in the
endlessly cited works of Foucault but in Steven Lukes' Power-A Radical View.22 Lukes begins with the traditional left point that power
should be seen, not merely as explicit coercion, but as residing in structures that influence behavior, often tacitly. He then points out that, on a
structural view, the identification of power requires normative as well as
descriptive judgments. To make any worthwhile use of the idea of
power in connection with a social structure that influences A and B, we
have to be able to determine that the conduct influenced by the structure
is in or against the interests of A and B. For example, we might want to
say that the structure gives A power over B because the conduct is in the
interests of A and against the interests of B.
This means that to talk about power we need judgments or intuitions about human interests. The interests we need to consider include
ones that are "objective" in the sense that the subject will not always
articulate or even be aware of them. Such judgments and intuitions are
a pragmatic one: it's not very useful to practitioners for thinking about and articulating the choices
they have to make. On the other hand, the value of good ethical theory is its commitment to
understanding practical choices from the viewpoint of a practitioner.
20. For a generally sympathetic account, see JIM MILLER, THE PASSION OF MICHEL FOUCAULT
(1993).
21. See Guyora Binder, Representing Nazism: Advocacy and Identity in the Trial of Klaus
Barbie, 98 YALE L.J. 1321 (1989), 1355-83.
22. (1974). Lucie White makes use of Lukes's analysis in To Learn and To Teach: Lessons
from Driefontein on Lawyering and Power, 1988 Wis. L. REv. 699, 747-68.
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inescapably moral. Except on the shallowest level, to talk about power
we also have to be willing to talk about exploitation. If this is right, then
the antinomianism of post-modernism guarantees that its discussions of
power will be shallow.
This is not to deny that Foucault and other post-modernists have
produced valuable case studies of domination. But these successes, far
from vindicating their vacuous general theorizing about power, are, in
fact, parasitic on unarticulated moral premises of the sort these writers
are prone to disparage when they encounter them explicitly. For example, Foucault's dramatic portraits of confinement practices 23 draw a
major part of their force from moral indignation aroused through tacit
appeals to liberal humanist values, though Foucault was never able to
acknowledge such values directly except to heap contempt on them.
The new poverty law scholarship shows the same contrast between
often striking case studies and an inadequate general notion of power
and domination.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The great achievement of the new poverty law scholarship is to
show how the normatively uncontroversial principle that the poor client
deserves the lawyer's respect and understanding requires a vastly more
complex undertaking than most lawyers have supposed. Unfortunately,
however, the scholars have given less attention to the normatively more
controversial issues of ethics and political economy that reveal actual
and potential conflict and division among poor people. In doing so, they
have tended to sentimentalize poor clients and especially poor "communities," to ignore the legitimate ethical claims of lawyers to influence
their work, and to underestimate the difficulties of collective practice.

23. MICHEL FOUCAULT, MADNESS AND CIVILIZATION
AND PUNISH (1977).

(1965);

MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE

